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METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS IN SOCIOLOGY

II

In the first part of this paper there has been an attempt to show that description, generalization, and purely physical causation—i. e., the method of the physical sciences—when applied to the data of sociology, to the exclusion of every other method, will give inadequate results. The element of appreciation which is characteristic of metaphysical investigation was deemed to be necessary owing to the nature of the units and the sort of causation involved, etc. Furthermore, the contention was made, on general grounds, that sociology ought to, and in many cases where it gives an adequate explanation of the facts does, introduce an element of appreciation; or, in other words, a metaphysical element.

It is our purpose in this part to take up some of the most characteristic conceptions of the sociology of the present day, and to examine them with a view toward determining whether or not they involve the metaphysical element contended for in the first part.

The first sociological principle to be considered is "consciousness of kind," advanced by Professor Giddings in his *Principles of Sociology*, *Elements of Sociology*, and papers published in various ways. In his *Principles of Sociology* he defines "consciousness of kind" as "a state of consciousness in which any being, whether high or low in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself."¹ In his *Elements of Sociology*, a later work, he has changed this definition so that it reads thus: "The consciousness of kind, then, is that pleasurable state of mind which includes organic sympathy, the perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection, and the desire for recognition."² This definition is repeated without

¹ *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1896), p. 17.

² *Elements of Sociology* (New York, 1898), p. 66.

change in his article on "Consciousness of Kind" in the Baldwin *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, which was published four years after his second work, and it will therefore be the one adopted in the discussion which is to follow.

In the attempt to find a metaphysical element in the principle of consciousness of kind, the definition given above and Professor Giddings' exposition of the principle in his two books will be made the basis of the discussion.

We have seen, in the first part of the present paper, that the units with which sociology has to deal are conscious individuals. Professor Wundt holds that, since social organization has individuals for its final unities, and so personalities, we can call social organizations *Personalorganisationen*.³ Consequently, it is only fitting that the present discussion should begin with a consideration of the place of the self in consciousness of kind.

The argument for the necessity of the self-notion in and the appreciative nature of consciousness of kind, which is to follow, might arouse in the mind of someone the question: Does Professor Giddings really deny the self-notion as a constituent of consciousness of kind; does he deny that there is an appreciative moment necessary in it; would he not be ready to admit all the contentions of the present paper? Or, in other words, an objector might say that the following argument is aimed at a "man of straw," at an intellectual position that does not exist. In order to answer this, we shall quote portions from Professor Giddings' books which will show that his general point of view makes it utterly impossible for him to allow the presence of the self in consciousness of kind, since he holds that the only sort of really causal energy in social phenomena is purely physical energy. The purely physical nature which he ascribes to social process makes it altogether impossible for him to admit that the self is present in it as a motive power.

It may be said, in the first place, that in the preface to the third edition of *Principles of Sociology*, Professor Giddings very distinctly denies the accusation that his principle is a metaphysical abstraction. Furthermore, we must call to mind one of his

³ Wundt, *Logik*, 2d ed., Vol. II, p. 603.

expressions, quoted earlier in the paper, taken from the *Elements of Sociology*, p. 66, when he says:

The consciousness of kind is the cause of all the social activities which men enter upon intelligently.

In view of this, how can he admit that consciousness of kind is largely appreciative when we find such expressions as the following?

Social evolution is but a phase of cosmic evolution. All social energy is transmuted physical energy. The conversion of physical into social energy is inevitable, and it necessarily occasions those orderly changes in groupings and relationships that constitute development. Or, the statement may be made in slightly different terms, the original causes of social evolution are the processes of physical equilibration, which are seen in the integration of matter with the dissipation of motion, or in the integration of motion with the disintegration of matter.⁴

Or, on the following page we read:

These generalizations — of the persistence of force, the universal process of equilibration, and the physical necessity of evolution — have not been successfully assailed. . . . These generalizations are as true of the social population as they are of inorganic matter.⁵

Again, he says:

All the energy expended in the growth and activity of population is derived from the physical world. Here let me explain what I mean by social energy. Throughout this work society has been regarded as essentially a phenomenon of thought and feeling. Now thought and feeling, merely as states of consciousness, are not energy. Apart from energy, however, they can do nothing. [All along here we must remember that he says that consciousness of kind is the cause of all social activities which we enter upon intelligently.] They can manifest themselves in external action only through the physical energy of nerve and muscle. Therefore, all that is done in society, or by society, whether consciously or otherwise, is accomplished by physical energy. Neither in society nor elsewhere is there any other kind of energy. Accordingly if we speak of psychical energy, we use for convenience a term that can denote nothing more than a special form of physical energy; namely, the nervous energy that is directly associated with consciousness. Briefly then, although social phenomena are for the most part conscious phenomena, there is no social activity that is not physical activity.⁶

⁴ *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 363 f.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 365, 366.

Again, he says:

A high degree of evolution can be attained by society only if the motion lost is but slightly in excess of the motion gained.⁷

These quotations show how entirely his sociology is based upon physical principles, and how utterly impossible it is for him—if he would maintain the slightest amount of consistency—to admit the self-notion in a socially causal principle such as consciousness of kind.

These ultra-physical remarks appear largely toward the latter part of his *Principles of Sociology*, when he is stating his position in reference to the general nature and method of sociological explanation. Nothing more positivistic than these statements could be desired. But, while they are still fresh in our mind, let us contrast with them some other statements which we find here and there in his exposition.

In this process [the social process] the human mind, aware of itself, forms and carries out policies for the organization and perfection of social life, in order that the great end of society, *the perfection of the individual personality*, may be completely attained. *Society is not a purely mechanical product of physical evolution. To a great extent it is an INTENDED product of psychological evolution.*⁸

This is a hard saying when it is remembered that it is uttered almost as the final words of a book which says that a high degree of social evolution can be attained only if the motion lost is but slightly in excess of the motion gained. It, however, conclusively brings into prominence one thing; and that is that when he is theorizing, or discussing sociology as a whole, he sticks to the purely mechanical view of its subject-matter and the method of its explanation; but when he gets to the actual interpretation of social phenomena, he is constrained, notwithstanding all his earlier protestations to the contrary, to admit that this—might we call it—plus element is a necessary part of the explanation. This plus element is of course the appreciative, the purposive, that which embodies worth.

After this digression, we will proceed with the argument.

⁷ *Elements of Sociology*, p. 340.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 350; the italics in this quotation are mine.

Professor Giddings, in defending his principle against the criticism that it is merely a biological fact, holds that the very fact that there is a consciousness involves it in a higher science, viz., psychology. Then he goes on to say that within the realm of the facts of psychology one must distinguish between those conscious phenomena which are social and those which are not social. He says:

According to the argument of this volume, the simplest known or conceivable social state of the mind is a sympathetic consciousness of resemblance between the self and the not-self. Consequently, a consciousness of *difference* between the self and the not-self is a fact of psychology only; while a sympathetic consciousness of *resemblance* between the self and the not-self is both a fact of psychology and a datum of sociology. In other words, the apprehension by the self of its own image in the not-self seems to me the natural point of departure of sociology from psychology.⁹

Taking him at his word here, and combining this with a section from his smaller book, gives us a very plain admission of the necessity of the self in consciousness of kind. In the quotation just given he says:

The simplest known or conceivable social state is a sympathetic consciousness of resemblance between the *self* and the *not-self*.¹⁰

In the other book he says:

Complex as it is, consciousness of kind is the *simplest of all states of mind*¹⁰ that can be called social.¹¹

By an entirely legitimate inference, we get the proposition: Consciousness of kind is a sympathetic consciousness of resemblance between the self and the not-self. This would then give us a perfect right to say that his principle involves the self-notion as an essential element. Again, he says:

The shifting elements of circumstance and the varying moods of personality must be taken into account before we can tell how the consciousness of kind will form itself and will direct action in any concrete case.¹²

The use of the term "personality" in this sentence is sufficient substantiation of our position. Dr. J. W. L. Jones, in an investi-

⁹ *Principles of Sociology*, preface to the 3d ed., p. xii.

¹⁰ Italics mine.

¹¹ *Elements of Sociology*, p. 66.

¹² *Principles of Sociology*, p. xiv.

gation as to the origin of sympathy, has considered the rise of consciousness of kind, and concludes that there are two factors which must be incorporated in this principle, and explained. They are (1) the representative consciousness, and (2) the consciousness of self.¹³

Professor Ormond holds that the "end-seeking" activity, which is the characteristic sort of activity in the biological sphere, is, in so far, a "kind-realizing" activity also.

In like manner we are obliged to trace the primary root of the sense of kind to the self in some primary individual nature, that, in becoming internally conscious, becomes also the "fontal type" of all the ends which it seeks objectively. The sense of kind, or, in a more developed form, the notion of kind, is thus, in the last analysis, the sense or notion of that which is *congruous* with the feeling or notion of self, while the absence of the sense of kind would involve the absence or failure of this sense of congruity.¹⁴

The element of feeling and its appreciative significance might be emphasized here, but that is reserved for another time. The question might arise as to how we get the sense of congruity, and the most adequate answer would be: through ejection (ejection refers to the interpretation of others in terms of one's self), since that is not alone a very important and essential moment in the dialectic of the self-growth, but also it is the mode of interpreting the facts when, e. g., the child sees someone talk, walk, etc. He interprets those facts in the light of his own experience, and finds that he performs similar activities; and thus the sense of congruity arises. This is borne out by Professor Ormond's statement that the "absence of the kind-sense indicates the non-assimilable social material;"¹⁵ for here the criterion of whether or not the material is assimilable would be "ejective interpretation."

An objector to the present contention, that the self is involved in consciousness of kind, may say, as Professor Giddings does practically, that consciousness of kind exists in more or less vague forms all the way down the animate scale.¹⁶ But we will, in turn, ask how this conception of the consciousness of kind arises in the

¹³ Jones, "Sociality and Sympathy," *Psychological Review*, Monograph Supplement, No. 18.

¹⁴ *Foundations of Knowledge*, pp. 288 f.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

¹⁶ *Principles of Sociology*, p. 17.

mind of the investigator; for that is where it must be in order to become a conscious sociological principle, and consequently before it can become a scientific principle. It cannot arise in his mind before the self-notion has arisen, and therefore is not the attribution of consciousness of kind to these lower spheres of animate existence, simply reading something into their minds which is in ours, but stripped of the qualities which we know cannot exist in those minds. But can it be consciousness of kind in those lower stages; is it not a vague sense of resemblance, which in the higher realms becomes consciousness of kind? These lower stages, while not real cases of consciousness of kind, would have a value for sociology simply as showing that there is a gradual development which later emerges into consciousness of kind; just as, and no more than, sociology finds that looking into animal societies is of value on account of the light which they throw upon human society which is the proper problem of the science. Someone might say that the view here taken as to what is meant by the term "society" is too narrow. Consequently the present writer cites as authority Professors Giddings and Baldwin, in the Baldwin *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. The distinction is made between "society" and "company." The definition of "society" signed by both of the above-mentioned is: "a social group characterized by some degree of reflection and voluntary co-operation."¹⁷ This is immediately followed by the following definition, taken from Professor Giddings' smaller book, which calls society "a number of like-minded individuals who know their like-mindedness, and are therefore able to work together for common ends."¹⁸ Now, psychologists are agreed that "reflective co-operation" would be impossible for animals, since they have not sufficiently the power of reflection. Professor Giddings' definition comes out even more strongly when he says that these individuals of society "*know* their like-mindedness." Such a knowledge would be altogether impossible for animals. This strengthens the above contention that the process of shearing down consciousness of kind to a state which might appear in an

¹⁷ Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 543 f.

¹⁸ *Elements of Sociology*, p. 6.

animal consciousness is an entirely unnecessary one, and therefore it does not militate against our position that consciousness of kind involves the self. Mr. Lester Ward's definition of "sociology"¹⁹ also clearly takes the position that the province of sociology is *human* society. This would lead us, then, to the conclusion that the consensus of opinion would have sociology deal only with human individuals. Not only this, but a consciousness of kind which shall be a real principle of sociological explanation and interpretation, one which shall be adequate for the data to be considered, is one which will involve self-consciousness as an essential moment.

It will now be our problem, having achieved the notion of the self as necessary in consciousness of kind, to see whether there is any element of appreciation involved in it. When the application of the categories of exact science to certain given facts does not prove fruitful, when there is some uniqueness about them that remains unexplained, the only inference left us is that they belong to some field farther advanced than the one to which belong the categories which we are using. This uniqueness is sometimes an indefinable feeling, which, however, is as authoritative as it is indefinable. Now, applying this general consideration to this particular case, if the self can be shown to have a certain uniqueness about it, to be of such a sort that the categories of scientific description, generalization, and causal reference will not fully reach it, then we can rightly say that there is an appreciative moment contained in it. It will therefore be necessary to bring testimony that the self possesses this attribute of uniqueness, and then to point out that the ordinary categories of description are inadequate to it, if they be applied unsupplemented.

Professor James, in his example of Peter and Paul, says that upon waking, Peter

remembers his own states, whilst he only *conceives* Paul's. Remembrance is like direct feeling; its object is suffused with a warmth to which no object of mere conception ever attains.²⁰

By way of slight digression, might it not here be suggested that a consciousness of kind which shall be an adequate sociological

¹⁹ *Pure Sociology*, p. 4.

²⁰ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 39.

principle must consist largely in this "warmth or intimacy" which seems to be an appreciative experience because we cannot translate it into more exact terms than calling it an attitude? Sensational analysis in its case fails as inadequate. Or at another place we read:

The altogether unique kind of interest which each human mind feels in those parts of creation which it can call *me* or *mine* may be a moral riddle, but it is a psychological fact.²¹

In view of this, might we not ask: Among the *not-me's*, do not those *not-me's* which, by consciousness of kind, I find to be like me, share to some extent in the uniqueness of the "me"?

Professor Royce says:

The Self is not a Thing, but a Meaning embodied in a conscious life. Its individuality, in case of any human being, implies the essential uniqueness of this life. . . . The empirical variety, complexity, ambiguity, and inconsistency of our present consciousness of the self, is to be explained as due to the fact that in a real order of the universe, no individual self is or can be isolated, or in any sense sundered, from other selves, or from the whole realm of the inner life of nature itself.²²

This utterance is sufficiently clear, in its relation to our purpose, to demand no further comment.

Professor James, in treating of the spiritual self as one of the constituents of the self, is speaking of an element in this stream of consciousness which seems to be sort of a permanent one, and therefore a self; and so he says:

Compared with this element of the stream, the other parts, even of the subjective life, seem transient external possessions, of which each in turn can be disowned, whilst that which disowns them remains. Now, *what is this self of all the other selves?*

Probably all men would describe it in much the same way up to a certain point. They would call it the *active* element in all consciousness; saying that whatever qualities a man's feelings may possess, or whatever content his thought may include, *there is a spiritual something in him which seems to go out to meet*²³ these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to *come in* to be received by it. It is what welcomes or rejects.²⁴

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

²² *World and the Individual*, 2d Ser., p. 269.

²³ Italics in this phrase mine, except the words "to go out," which are italicized by the author; all other italics in the quotation are his.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 297.

He then goes on to say :

One may, I think, . . . believe that all men must single out from the rest of what they call themselves, some central principle of which each would recognize the foregoing²⁵ to be a fair general description — accurate enough, at any rate, to denote what is meant, and keep it unconfused with other things.²⁶

Now, when he says “all men,” the immediate and necessary inference is that each man must do this for himself, that no one can do it fully for anyone else; thus showing that the experience is unique for each individual. This is borne out when he says, immediately following the above :

The moment, however, they come to closer quarters with it, trying to define more accurately its precise nature, we should find opinions beginning to diverge.

This sentence, and the characterization in foregoing pages of his own analysis as a “fair general description, accurate enough, at any rate, to denote what is meant, and to keep it unconfused with other things,” show that he recognizes that the experience of the self is an altogether individual one, and that it cannot be given any more than a very vague general description. When he uses the phrase, “to denote what is meant,” he tacitly recognizes that he can describe but partly that which he wishes to characterize, viz., the self, and that those who would understand what he has to say about the real inner self will have to translate his characterization into terms of their own inner content; or, in other words, he is endeavoring to transfer content which is appreciative, and is able to do so only by a rough sketch, so to speak, which reveals its true meaning only when again transformed into appreciative experience by the hearer or reader. Any other way of transferring such appreciative content would be impossible. And we must remember that even then the content itself cannot be transferred, but only, as far as we can say, a similar content aroused within the other.

Thus the significance of this would be that we see that the self

²⁵ Referring here to an analysis of self-consciousness, a portion of which has preceded this quotation.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 298.

in its essential nature is appreciative as well as descriptive. Furthermore, the very divergence of opinion spoken of above, which results from attempting accurate description exclusively, shows that descriptive categories are not adequate; and may we not, therefore, infer that it is the very fact of the inadequacy of these categories that gives rise to the divergencies of opinion. An objector might say that this point is contradicted when Professor James says that he thinks he can tell in what this feeling of a central or active self consists.²⁷ But what he is really doing is to put that experience into appreciatively descriptive terms. This, and the contention that the objection noted has no validity, are shown by his own statement that this analysis of his may be found by someone else to fit that one's own experience, but that he cannot at all guarantee that it will, and that it is just as probable that there is some individual whose self-consciousness it will not fit. These are further substantiated by his remarks to the effect that his own feeling of self cannot be generalized, as it might, in points, be contradicted by the experience of someone else, showing that he is dealing with something that is individual. Furthermore, it is to be noted, in support of the present contention, that he always characterizes the experience by the term "feeling," as when he says: "But when it [the central self] is found, it is *felt*;"²⁷ or, "the feeling of this central active self," etc. Professor Giddings strongly emphasizes this notion of the element of feeling as a very prominent one, not so much in the self as in consciousness of kind which, of course, includes the self; and thus any element of feeling in the self would naturally accrue also to the consciousness of kind.

Professor James further admits that description does not cover self-consciousness when he gives as the result of his analysis the following:

That (in some persons at least) the part of the innermost self which is most vividly felt turns out to consist for the most part of a collection of cephalic movements of "adjustments" which, for want of attention and reflection, usually fail to be perceived and classed as what they are; that *over and above these there is an obscurer feeling of something more*.²⁸

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 299; italics in quotation are his.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 355; italics mine.

Then he goes on to say that what this obscurer feeling is, is still an open question. He here recognizes the need of this "plus" element—might we call it the over-descriptive moment?—which is embodied in what he calls the "obscurer feeling of something more." It is in this obscurer feeling that we get the appreciative moment. It must be appreciative, since it successfully resists description.

Professor Ormond takes the position that

the reaction of the subject-consciousness is a *reaction as a whole*, and self-apprehension will be a function of this mode of reaction. . . . If we are sure of our self-activity, we have that assurance because we grasp it in an act of *immediate intuition*.²⁹ It cannot be disputed, then, that we know the fact of our self-activity. . . . If in the reactive consciousness, *self-activity*, and not simply activity that has no label, is revealed, then it is clear that we have a qualification of the content as a whole which renders it not merely a *that*, but a *what*.³⁰ The fact that the activity is taking the form of a self shows that it is not formless, but is defining itself as a whole. This being conceded, it follows that there may be a mode of knowing which consists in defining a content as an indivisible whole, whose representation cannot for that reason be achieved piecemeal or broken up into bits. And if this much be granted, as we think it must, the impossibility of reducing self-consciousness to the definiteness of objective representation has been accounted for; while, at the same time, the possibility of another type of knowing, to which this content is amenable, is left open.³¹

This point from Professor Ormond's book has been quoted at length because it points out very clearly that the categories of description are not large or intensive enough to cover the material in the self-consciousness; while the outcome leads one's thought directly to appreciation, as it seems to have done his, when on p. 268 he says:

The soul is not conscious of itself as standing alone, or as including and responding to the agency of its other. The fact of collision, which is the most external phenomenon of social relationships, we have seen to be essentially internal and leading to internal modifications of the colliding elements. It is this internalness of the social situation, entering as it does, as a real moment, into self-consciousness, that exerts the profoundly modifying influence on the soul's sense of its own agency of which we have spoken above.

This consciousness on the part of the self of its own agency as including and responding to the agency of its other is essentially

²⁹ Italics mine.

³⁰ Italics his.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 255.

appreciative. Furthermore, as the consciousness of interactivity develops, each phase of its development has a more particular significance and deeper meaning for us; and it is this meaning that cannot be gotten by description. The whole process is stated in internal terms as being the only adequate ones, and thus is beyond pure description. It is to be remembered, however, that this is not to be taken to mean that the consciousness of self is altogether an appreciative process. It is to be emphasized that all that we are contending for is that it *includes* appreciation as one of its essential moments.

Now, to get practically the same conclusion from another point of view, let us see what Professor Wundt has to tell us upon this topic. He holds that

as there are always some muscles in a state either of tension or of activity, it follows that we never lack a sense, either dim or clear, of the positions or movements of our own body. . . . This permanent sense, moreover, has the peculiarity that we are aware of our power, at any moment, voluntarily to arouse any of its ingredients. We excite the sensations of movement immediately by such impulses of the will as shall arouse the movements themselves; and we excite the visual and tactile feelings of our body by the voluntary movement of our organs of sense. So we come to conceive this permanent mass of feeling as immediately or remotely subject to our will, and call it the consciousness of our self.³²

It would seem legitimate from this to hold that, since the feeling of — might we call it — muscular potential is always internal, not directly to be imparted to any other, it is unique for each individual, and therefore appreciative.

The foregoing discussion would tend to show that whatever the psychological doctrine of the self may be, if it is at all adequate, it will be found to contain some appreciative element. It might be added, in this connection, that such exceedingly definite experiences of the self as that involved in pure thought-activities are not even approached by this notion of muscular potential. Now, if there is an appreciative moment present in this low, vague stage of the self-notion, how much more so is it necessary in the higher consciousness of the self involved in such thought-processes! Moreover, self-consciousness

³² *Physiologische Psychologie*, 2d ed., Vol. II, pp. 217-19.

reaches a very high degree of intensity in the higher forms of social intercourse. To sum up, the conclusions of this part up to this point might be said to be two. In the first place, the principle of consciousness of kind was found to contain the self-notion as a necessary and essential element.³³ The self, furthermore, was found to demand more than the application of descriptive categories in order to have an adequate characterization—not to mention even explanation; thus making appreciation one of its essential moments. The conclusion here is, then, that from these two arguments taken together we are justified in maintaining that consciousness of kind does and must include appreciation in order to be a consciousness of kind.

The consideration of consciousness of kind will continue with a more or less general examination of some of the other elements of the principle as defined by Professor Giddings, to find out whether they also involve appreciation. We will therefore, without any further preamble, plunge directly into the argument, following, to a great extent, the order of the statement of the elements in Professor Giddings' definition cited above.³⁴

We read in the definition that consciousness of kind is a "pleasurable state of mind." In the above-mentioned preface the author states that he has had some difficulty in selecting a proper name for this principle, owing to the fact that neither perception nor feeling might be omitted; for a "consciousness of kind that includes feeling with perception is dynamic."³⁵ This shows the great importance of feeling in making the principle a dynamic one. That this is desirable is shown by the fact that he holds consciousness of kind to be the cause of all social activities which are intelligent and conscious, and not merely automatic or impulsive.³⁶ The fact of the stress put upon feeling as a constituent in this principle, which is given as the cause of consciously social activities, leads one to compare this with what Professor Ormond says:

³³ In fact, if the self-notion is not permitted as a moment in it, consciousness of kind becomes an absurdity.

³⁴ *Vide* p. 49.

³⁵ *Principles of Sociology*, Preface to 3d ed., p. xiv.

³⁶ *Elements of Sociology*, p. 66.

The complete realization of the social consciousness in which the agencies of the self and not-self become mutually inclusive, is a consummation in which the dynamic consciousness is transcended, and the principle of comprehension is reached in the intuition of the æsthetic consciousness. . . . It is in this æsthetic experience that the subject's self-intuition completes itself.⁸⁷

Getting behind a small detail in terminology, we see the fundamental similarity, though the former would hardly care to admit the implications which the latter expresses. It brings out, however, an important consideration in the argument for the presence of appreciation in the principle. It is here also that the worth-element, which we have seen is appreciative, would appear in consciousness of kind.

Consciousness of kind is further said to be the "perception of resemblance." But it is more than this when we come to examine it. Certain differences between ourselves and others are felt or perceived. We should have no sense of our own individuality as apart from the others, if we had only this perception of resemblance and nothing else. There must be some consciousness of some central point of departure for the judgment of resemblance. There must, furthermore, be reflection upon this perception of identity behind difference. Take an anthropoid ape, for example; man will not have any consciousness of kind with it. But why not? The ape has many similarities of bodily structure, he walks upright, and so on. As to his mental make-up, he imitates with ease human actions which it would be impossible for any other sort of animal to imitate; there is a great display of affection by the simian mother toward her offspring; she embraces it as would a human mother; and so, why is there no consciousness of kind? It will be answered that reflection upon such similarities and differences would never bring a consciousness of kind, since that almost intangible feeling which seems to be present in consciousness of kind, as found in the human mind, would be absent; and then, too, the resemblances are not sufficiently exact. When asked what is the criterion upon which is based the judgment of insufficiency, the judgment will be found to be based largely upon the principle of sufficient reason; i. e., the criterion by which the

⁸⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 252.

reasons for saying that the similarities are too few and the differences too great is accepted by ourselves for true on the strength merely of the degree of conviction that they occasion within us. The principle is rather one of philosophical thought, and, as a criterion, would scarcely be admitted by physical science. An extreme empirical sociologist might answer that there is a consciousness of kind present in the case cited, but merely of a lower degree than the consciousness of kind which prevails among human beings. We would answer him by saying that an analysis of consciousness in both cases will reveal something unique in the consciousness of kind involved in the case of human beings, and so different in *quality* from that involved in observing the ape. The judgment involved in consciousness of kind among men is entirely unlike the judgments upon the other objects of consciousness. There is even a qualitative difference in the consciousness of kind felt by individuals in a certain social stratum toward others of a different position. The average man feels, e. g., a certain indefinable difference between himself and a colored man. How much greater, therefore, must be the feeling of uniqueness when the consciousness of kind between individuals of a high social stratum is compared with that which, it would be claimed, does exist between them and animals! There is found to be something unique in the judgment of kind for which the ordinary judgments of science are entirely inadequate. So here again we are led to an appreciative point of view.

An example of sympathetic insight—one of the elements of consciousness of kind—might be gotten from the testimony of musicians who say that to hear a great artist render a difficult composition gives them more pleasure, perhaps, than it does those who have not tried to play it. They realize the difficulties that have been overcome, the fine shadings in interpretation, and the technique that the artist has displayed, and consequently the performance means much more to them. Does this not involve a certain community of consciousness between performer and hearer? Can we not see here a direct application of the same principle in sociological explanation? The performer's achievement has richer significance as the hearer has richer musical con-

tent into which to receive it; and, just so, the actions of an individual in a society will mean much more, and in fact attain their true significance, *only* when, in the first place, we who try to explain and interpret that act recognize that they have the same sort of processes as ourselves, i. e., when we recognize that they are of like kind with ourselves, and when we interpret what they have done in terms of our own inner content. Another example of this can be taken from common life, when one person says of the action of another: "I cannot understand why he did that." This means that the one cannot conceive of himself acting in the given way under similar circumstances. It seems to me that here the heightened enjoyment as well as comprehension — for we are told that consciousness of kind is a pleasurable state as well — is a direct result of a sympathetic appreciation of the other's actions, and that this contention is directly supported by the argument in Adam Smith's *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*.³⁸ That sympathy is important in consciousness of kind is shown by the fact that Professor Giddings mentions it twice in his definition: first as organic sympathy, and then as conscious and reflective sympathy. How nearly reflective sympathy and appreciation are related is shown by the fact that the modern doctrines of appreciation seem to have had their source historically in Adam Smith's doctrine of sympathy.

Professor Bain speaks of

the characteristic moment of the sympathetic impulse — the being laid hold of and engrossed by those suggested feelings as connected with another person; the taking that person altogether into our own mental grasp, to the setting aside of our own personality.³⁹

T. H. Green says:

Sympathy involves such a conceived identity or unity in difference between the spectator's own person and the other that the same impression in being determined also by the consciousness of the other is an "alter-ego." Thus sympathy . . . is found to involve the determination between pleasure and pain, not merely by self-consciousness, but by the self-consciousness which is also self-identification with another.⁴⁰

³⁸ Vol. I, Part I, sec. 1.

³⁹ *Emotions and Will*, p. 121.

⁴⁰ *Introduction to Hume*, Vol. II, sec. 40.

Neither of these statements is to be taken to mean that the subject has lost consciousness of himself as opposed to the object in the state of identification; for he has not, as Green's phrase "or unity in difference" shows. He comes to recognize himself in the object. With these statements of the reflectively sympathetic consciousness before us, we can say that, consequently, the constituent element of consciousness of kind which involves reflective sympathy, involves a moment of appreciation for the above characterization of sympathy, certainly brings in appreciation in the state of the partial identification of his own person with that of the other.

In answer to the question of how we come to know and affirm other individuals than ourselves, Professor Ormond answers that it is not alone inference from external signs, but we are told that the self "is essentially a *socius*," which includes the other within itself, and therefore, "in the act in which the soul asserts itself, it also posits its other; that is another individual."⁴¹ Now, the fact that the self and the other are posited already shows the appreciative nature of the matter. He goes on, furthermore, to point out that from this just mentioned "positing" of the other together with the self it would follow that the individual's environment ought altogether to appear to him to be other selves. This is very evident in child-life, where the distinction between persons and things is not made; e. g., when the child strikes the chair against which it stubbed its toe. The distinction begins to arise, however, through actual trial and error, through experience which will teach us that some individuals with which we come in contact are not persons, but things. This inability to distinguish between persons and things disappears as consciousness of self appears. The judgments about persons will be felt to be different from those about things, with the result that judgments about persons have that uniqueness about them which we cannot exactly describe, and which has been mentioned before.

Might we not, by this time, analyze consciousness of kind as a psychosis in which the individual who is conscious of kind possesses this consciousness, not by completely identifying him-

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 277 ff.

self with the other, but by attributing to the other certain processes like his own, and which he feels are individual in that other, but the correspondents of which are also *individual* in himself? He has certain processes which he recognizes as being his own; but among those which are his own he feels that there are some the like of which might be possessed by other individuals, and so on such a basis he judges the others to be of like kind with himself. It might be asked: But in what way does he come to attribute—or, to use Professor Giddings' term, "eject"—those certain processes into the other individuals, and thus get consciousness of kind? It seems probable that the process of ejection would take place upon seeing the other individual react in the same way in which the given individual would himself react upon certain processes which he feels to be a part of himself.

This analysis of the consciousness of kind as having an internal, and therefore appreciative, moment is merely a preliminary to, yet substantiated by, Professor Ormond's exceedingly acute statement of the origin of consciousness of kind, when he holds that

The dialectic of the social consciousness is one in which the subject or self develops into a *socius*. This may be called the subject-moment of the activity. But the dialectic would not be conceivable if it did not include also a moment of objective activity which is determinative of the nature of the other. The peculiarity of the situation is that it is a compound dualism; the subject determination resulting in a self that is a *socius*, while the object determination in which, as we have seen, the moment of self is included, results in an object or other that is a self. The whole social situation must include, then, the representation of a subject that is a *socius* in dialectical relations with an object or other that is a social self, and the dialectic will be simply the reciprocal or interacting relations of these self-terms in which each not only distinguishes itself from its other in the fundamental differentiation of the self from its object or not-self, but also *identifies* itself with its other in the sense or notion of kind. In short, the social situation is a modification of the general psychic situation brought about by the incorporation into consciousness of the sense or notion of kind.⁴²

In view of this he observes that we subjectively apprehend the self that includes the other. This is without question appreciation.

Someone might say that the social relationship is not such a

⁴² *Op. cit.*, p. 292.

complex process at all. Such a complex psychological doctrine is by no means a requisite for the present contention. Suppose the social relationship is regarded as something much simpler than this, as simply a man-to-man intercourse without any thought of my notion of myself as including a notion of another, and so on. Going on this simple notion of social relationship, what would be the essential criterion on the basis of which the consciousness of kind is asserted? This would be found to be in a conscious give-and-take process in which the medium of exchange is *thoughts*. Just as soon as you throw out some thought and it brings a response from someone else, just so soon do you recognize him to be of like kind with yourself, since your own thought is, so to speak, directly reflected back to you; i. e., their reaction transmits thought-content to you. Animals do not give back a single thought. It is this conscious give-and-take process, this community of thought, that binds people together; that makes ejective interpretation more than mere imagination; that gives ejection its validity. This response is not indirect, but *direct*, since it takes place directly upon my own action. It is this direct and similar response to our thought that furnishes us with a criterion of judging others as of like kind with ourselves. If the objection to the preceding analysis of the social relationship was that it was too involved and abstract, it cannot hold here; for nothing can be more intimate, more concrete, than the recognition of another by your throwing out a thought, and his immediate return of it to you in slightly changed form. When we try to explain it, however, no matter how simple and direct it may seem, it will be found to require more than physical tendencies for its explanation.

This is directly supported by Professor Royce's basing the judgment of the reality of other individuals—our fellows—and therefore individuals like ourselves, upon a value-judgment, upon appreciation. He says:

Our fellows are known to be real and to have an inner life, because they are for each of us the endless treasury of *more ideas*. They answer our questions; they tell us news; they make comments; they pass judgments; they express novel combinations of feelings; they relate to us stories; they argue with us and take counsel with us. Or, to put the matter in a form still nearer

that demanded by our Fourth Conception of Being, our fellows furnish us with the constantly needed supplement to our own fragmentary meanings.⁴³

Our fellows, he would think, have value for us, since they fill out our partially fulfilled meanings; i. e., we appeal to them, since we have a *need* for the fulfilment of those meanings, with the result that the reality of others with whom we come in contact is asserted on the basis of a judgment of value, or an appreciative judgment.

Professor Giddings says:

All knowledge proceeds through comparison of the unknown with the known. This is simply one form of the method of least effort. In the opening chapter of this book it was shown that classification enables us to extend our knowledge to a degree that would be utterly impossible if we had no other means of dealing with new experiences but that of carrying every detail consciously in mind. Classification, then, is one of the methods that follow from the law of least effort.

And this is the procedure that is followed when individuals interpret one another in terms of themselves. . . . Discovering that certain of their acquaintances in certain particulars are very like themselves; . . . that yet others are but little like themselves, save in those human qualities that mark the entire species of mankind, they quickly form mental classes that are based upon these degrees of resemblance. This interpretation of others in terms of one's self may be called *ejective* interpretation. The word "*eject*" means a mental image of another which is derived largely from one's experiences of one's self. [In such a process, in the child for example] the child has mentally thrown himself into the perceived object, and he understands it because he has done so.

Thus, all interpretation of our fellow-beings is *ejective*. It proceeds through a comparison of themselves and ourselves in which the various points of resemblance and of difference are observed and classified. *Ejective* interpretation is the intellectual element in the consciousness of kind, which, therefore, is so far simply a consequence of the law that mental activity follows the line of least effort.⁴⁴

In this rather lengthy quotation it is seen that Professor Giddings apparently recognizes the fact that by conforming closely to the demand of some sociologists, that classification is *the* method, and *the only* method, for sociological investigation, his sociology would altogether lack any real explanation and interpretation of

⁴³ *The World and the Individual*, 2d Ser., p. 172.

⁴⁴ *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 341 ff.

the processes which he undertook to explain. Therefore, to be consistent with his general scientific position, and yet to give such explanation of the facts as their nature seems to demand, he subsumes this principle of ejective interpretation, which he says is the intellectual element of consciousness of kind, under the rubric of classification; and thus he would retain the approval of the above-mentioned thinkers.

But let us see what this "ejective interpretation" involves. Professor Giddings says that it is the interpretation of others in terms of one's self. But the processes which each individual recognizes as his own have a certain "warmth" and an "at-homeness" that no other processes have; they are internal. They are not only internal, but are also unique and individual; for no one else can have just those processes, nor can they be transferred in an unchanged state to anyone else. Therefore in this subjective interpretation there is an internal principle involved. We *appreciate* rather than observe the other man's action. If we were to stay with classification, then mere observation would be sufficient. Professor Giddings, though he does not explicitly say so, shows by his actions that he is not satisfied with classification, and wants deeper insight into the phenomena; and the means of getting this he finds to be ejective interpretation, which, we see, must and does involve this appreciative element — an element which cannot be put within the bounds which classifying science has set itself. It is further significant to note that the term "interpretation" has come to mean, not merely causal reference, but a process which is deeper, which involves appreciation. The conclusion gotten from this particular starting-point, and based directly upon the remarks of a sociologist, is entirely the same as that gotten from general considerations in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 370, 371. Furthermore, in the light of this, when he says that this ejective interpretation "proceeds through a comparison of themselves and ourselves in which the various points of resemblance and difference are observed and classified," we see that also the *comparison* through the observation of resemblance and difference is an appreciative process, since it involves the appreciative apprehen-

sion of others in terms of ourselves through which, and through which only, this resemblance can become conscious.

But this conclusion as to the appreciative nature of ejective interpretation not only has value for us from the fact that it supports the general contention of the whole of the present paper, but has a more immediate application. Professor Giddings has said that this ejective interpretation "is the intellectual element in consciousness of kind." Then, since it is a constitutive element of consciousness of kind, and since it has been shown to be appreciative, we can now see that, from this point of view also, the principle of consciousness of kind contains an element of appreciation; thus showing that what the first part of the paper contended should and must exist in sociological explanation, if it is to be adequate, really does exist in Professor Giddings' principle of consciousness of kind, though not admitted by its author.

When we contend that the consciousness of kind has in it a considerable element of appreciation, we are by no means repeating the old criticism that the principle is a metaphysical abstraction. We have at all times implicitly, if not explicitly, affirmed that it is a very real principle, a potent factor in social phenomena. What is argued for is that this force or principle, call it what you will, does contain appreciation as an essential and constitutive moment. We do not question at all the right of sociology to be called a separate branch of learning, nor do we hold that sociology is a metaphysic. We do not wish to be understood to hold that consciousness of kind is exclusively appreciative; but what is insisted upon here is that sociology does contain—and, if it would be adequate to the facts that it is called upon to interpret, must contain—a metaphysical element.

IMITATION

M. Gabriel Tarde agrees with Professor Giddings in holding to the necessity of having a psychic principle central in sociological explanation. He would, however, hold that it is imitation which explains societary phenomena. Linguistic, legislative, judicial, political, industrial, artistic, and similar developments, customs of life and of dress—all these have arisen through imi-

tation, and trains of imitations, of original inventions. These inventions, in turn—at least most of them—have arisen as a result of previous chains of imitations. In his *Laws of Imitation*⁴⁵ he advances many facts to substantiate his point. It will now be our problem to search, as briefly as possible, for some metaphysical element either in it or involved by it.

His definition of the term “imitation” certainly does not smack of the appreciative when he says:

I have always given it a very precise and characteristic meaning: that of the action at a distance of one mind upon another, and of action which consists of a quasi-photographic reproduction of a cerebral image upon the sensitive plate of another brain.⁴⁶

When we examine this critically, we find that he has accounted only for the purely sensory side of imitation. But how about the motor side? He has said that it is a “quasi-photographic reproduction of a cerebral image upon the sensitive plate of another brain.” How can this be imitation unless there is some activity on the part of the possessor of the “sensitive plate” toward actually working out that impression? There certainly must be some *activity* if imitation is to become social. Such a purely sensory process would be entirely inadequate to produce any social activities, and therefore such a sensory principle cannot be taken to be a sociological one, for, unsupplemented, it would explain nothing at all. For example, such an impression would not give an imitative basis for the later desires or inventions—for the present letting alone the question as to where the original desires and inventions which gave rise to the first chains of imitation came from.

M. Tarde thinks that, before there is an imitation of some invention in the individual, there is a clash of *two* alternatives, one of which is the old action satisfying the want. *After* the individual has adopted this, then only can social imitation begin.⁴⁷ This raises the question as to what are the criteria upon the basis of which these choices are made. He says somewhere that they are utility and truth. This demands that you should ask, in try-

⁴⁵ Tarde, *Laws of Imitation*, translated by E. C. Parsons (New York, 1903).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

ing to explain sociological facts, wherein truth consists, and we are, it would seem, in a metaphysical question. Nor can I see how sociological explanation can avoid asking itself such a question, i. e., as to the criteria of social choice. Professor Giddings realizes this very clearly when he says that the sociologist has three main quests. They are:

First, he must try to discover the conditions that determine mere aggregation and concurrence. Secondly, he must try to discover the law of social choices. . . . Thirdly, he must discover also the law that governs the natural selection and survival of choices.⁴⁸

Though the mode of expression is somewhat different, the problems that Professor Giddings suggests would largely involve what is spoken of here. Thus, from this point of view, there would seem to be a metaphysical moment directly involved in M. Tarde's principle.

If we reflect upon the sort of imitation which M. Tarde puts at the center of sociological explanation, we shall find that imitation cannot at all be a final term, since it is a term of process, and altogether leaves out of court the consideration of a point of departure for that process, *through which* the process is determined. Imitation is in no wise a real *causal* principle of sociological interpretation and explanation. It is merely the process whereby this interpretation not alone takes place, but also is made possible. When M. Tarde shows how a multitude of social phenomena come into being by imitation, he has in reality only described a process. When he has said that imitation explains the rise of many happenings in association, what he really has done is to give a descriptive formula of the *means by which* those phenomena are what they are, and has in no wise explained their real origin or interpreted their meaning. He seems to have aimed at interpretation; but that is possible only when we add to his process of imitation that which is gotten through the process, and in which alone consists the real explanation of why others do certain things. In other words, it must be supplemented by appreciative interpretation. When the child's father hits his thumb with the hammer, and then kicks the dog to let off some surplus

⁴⁸ *Principles of Sociology*, p. 20.

emotion, the child cannot understand it. He tries the experiment. It is not the process of imitation that enables him to understand why the dog was kicked, but it is the *result* of that process, viz., the experience which it gives him, and which he reads into his father's mind; then only does he understand why the dog suffered. It is only on the basis of such ejective interpretation that we gain the real significance of the actions of individuals in relation to other individuals. Professor Baldwin says:

It [imitation] enables me—the child—to pass from my experience of what you are, to an interpretation of what I am; and then from this fuller sense of what I am to a fuller knowledge of what you are.⁴⁹

In this consideration of M. Tarde's principle, we might with profit recall the statement by Mr. Bosanquet that "imitation is a bald and partial rendering of that complex reciprocal reference which constitutes social co-operation."⁵⁰ He says that a man holding a hammer upon a rivet and another striking it is reciprocal reference, but no one would call it imitation. This would show that there is something more in the real imitation found in society than there is in the principle. In substantiation of this we might cite the following:

Merely the fact of social imitation does not necessarily make things socially available. If so, my parrot would, by imitating me, come into social status with reference to me. Another factor is necessary (2), i. e., imitative assimilation and growth, whereby what is imitated is also organized in the individual's own thought, and imitatively ejected into others.⁵¹

Here it is noteworthy that there is a recognition on the part of a strong advocate of imitation as a social principle, of the fact that real imitation is not altogether an external process, but that what makes it a social principle is the internal element, the ejective interpretation. Furthermore, in addition to the foregoing, we must remember that when the child imitates his elders he learns by that process what were the internal states which preceded a certain reaction.

⁴⁹ *Mental Development*, p. 340.

⁵⁰ *Vide American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, p. 369.

⁵¹ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 3d ed., p. 536.

He reaches his subjective understanding of the social copy by imitation, and then he confirms his interpretations by another imitative act by which he ejective reads his self-thought into the persons of others.⁵²

The nature of ejective interpretation has been discussed above.⁵³

In further substantiation of this position that a principle of imitation, which shall be an adequate principle for sociological explanation, must have more than merely external reference, we might gather some testimony from the psychologist.

One of the most important functions of imitation is to introduce into one mind (the imitator's) content that has been present in the mind of another (the imitated). It may be asked whether the use of language does not cover this, and the answer will be that by imitation that content achieves greater clearness and more meaning in the mind of the imitator. Professor Stout, in speaking of the function of language in transmitting to the individual, content which he has not observed, and which it would be impossible for him to observe, says:

His [the individual's] debt is not merely confined to interchange of ideas by means of language. Imitation also plays a large part. In doing or attempting to do what others have done before him, he rethinks the thoughts which have passed through their minds; and he also in the same process acquires novel ideas, inasmuch as imitation is rarely, if ever, exact reproduction of that which is imitated.⁵⁴

M. Tarde holds that a great many social actions result from the imitation of some great personality. This imitation appears in a form somewhat analogous to hypnotic suggestion. But, as society becomes more complex, the number of suggesting personalities increases, with the result that a greater degree of freedom is reached in a "mutual imitation." He says:

Mutual imitation, mutual prestige, or *sympathy* in the sense of Adam Smith, is produced only in our so-called waking life and among people who seem to exercise no magnetic influence over one another.⁵⁵

The significance that this passage has for us is that he would make the terms "mutual imitation" and "sympathy in the meaning of Adam Smith" synonymous. This is shown by the fact that he

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 527.

⁵³ *Vide* pp. 522 f.

⁵⁴ *Manual of Psychology*, p. 510.

⁵⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 79.

makes out the reason for putting prestige and not sympathy at the basis of society to be that "the unilateral must have preceded the reciprocal." Mr. Spencer holds that in order to sympathize with our fellows we must be able to represent to ourselves their consciousness and their actual mental condition.⁵⁶ In this connection it might be added that Professor Ormond thinks that "the whole theory of imitation may be regarded as a grounding of this general principle by showing how the representation of another's consciousness is achieved."⁵⁷ This appreciative moment in the sympathetic consciousness has been previously commented upon.

The point that remains to be dwelt upon is that imitation is an appreciatively descriptive process through which the inner experience of one individual is enriched through the indirect transmission of content from the inner experience of another individual. This is brought out forcibly in Professor Ormond's article on the "Social Individual" when, after giving the example of the boy imitating his father's actions and learning thereby how his father feels, his conclusion of that portion of the argument is:

It is clear that the effort to imitate is in reality an effort on the part of the boy to identify himself with his model, and that his identification involves his reading himself consciously into the standpoint of his model, so that his own consciousness and that of his model [as a result of the imitation], so far forth as that special series of activities is concerned, shall be the same. . . . The touch that makes us kin is, therefore, an inner touch, while the objective and outer motive that leads to the touch is either an imitative movement or a representation that is rendered capable of a reference to the inner consciousness of another by means of its prior association with inner experiences of our own. . . . But when we pass from the consideration of external instruments to that of internal process, we will find that we are able to enter into intelligible social relations with our other only because our nature is such that we are able to draw from the inner definitions of our own consciousness brought about by certain objective agencies, a concept or construct of the consciousness of the other, which we conceive to be a true representation of his inner experience, and it is through this construct or representation that we are able to enter sympathetically into his life and treat him as a *socius*; a being like ourselves.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, "Corollaries;" I, "Sociality and Sympathy."

⁵⁷ *Psychological Review*, Vol. VIII (1901), p. 37.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 36 ff.

This clearly implies ejective interpretation which, we have concluded, is appreciative. It would, furthermore, very clearly bear out the above contention that imitation is only the process through which social phenomena become diffused, and would point out that imitation is only the appreciatively descriptive process whereby an appreciative content belonging to one individual is transferred to another individual, or, to state it more accurately, a process whereby a *similar* content is aroused. Again, just as in consciousness of kind we did not contend that the appreciative ingredient in consciousness of kind is the whole process, so here we do not assert that all imitation involves the appreciative moment, but we would assert its presence in any imitation where there is any *meaning* involved, where the imitator gains a fuller knowledge of himself and of others by means of the process.

Finally, does not the whole foregoing discussion enable us to suggest that Professor Giddings has stated a very fundamental truth—one which will lie at the basis of future sociology—when he holds that the causation involved in sociological explanation is more than merely physical causation, and also more than merely psychical causation; but that it is something which contains both—a new product, something unique, viz., what he calls *sociological* causation? The relation of this sociological to physical and psychical causation is, he says, analogous to the relation of protoplasm to the chemical elements of carbon, nitrogen, etc., which are elements in its make-up, but which are transcended in the new product. Then, too, we have seen that a sociology, if it would be adequate, must contain an element of appreciation to supplement description. This conclusion raises sociology to a distinctive and, in a limited sense, exclusive position in the hierarchy of knowledge above that of the physical sciences. The fact, however, that description still retains such a high degree of importance in it shows that sociology cannot be fused with a metaphysics. The result is that we must assign to sociology a position mediating between the physical sciences and metaphysics. This is in no wise an impossible position, since the world of description and the world of appreciation are not incommensurate,

but shade one into the other. All judgment, considered either logically or psychologically, is, in the last analysis, an *interpretation*, and so the judgment of description shades imperceptibly into the judgment of appreciation. It would seem that the investigation of the future which shall be the most fruitful will be one which recognizes that sociology does hold some such mediating position, analogous to that held by psychology, but perhaps on a slightly higher plane, and one which accordingly develops a method of procedure, a system of categories, distinctly its own.

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